Home-value insurance and idiosyncratic risks of residential property prices by Teye, Alfred Larm
6 Home-value insurance and idiosyncratic risks of
residential property prices
Under review
Abstract
The recent Global Financial Crisis has reawakened home-owners to the need for
protecting their home-equities from possible future house price decline. This paper
re-examines the Shiller andWeiss (1999) home-value insurance scheme and proposes
amodiﬁcation that eliminates a large proportion of the idiosyncratic sale price risks of
residential properties. Using data between 1995 and 2014 for Amsterdam, the
proposed insurance policy shows a higher pay-out eﬃciency, a higher loss coverage and
a greater pay-out probability than the original Shiller andWeiss (1999) scheme. The
new home-value insurance policy thus provides better protection for the property sale
price risks.
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§ 6.1 Introduction
.............................................................................................................................
Home-ownership has increasingly become the preferred housing tenure for most
European households and inmany other countries. In 2015, Eurostat estimated the
European average home-ownership rate at about 70%, with the range between 51.8%
in Germany and 96.5% in Romania. Research has revealed several beneﬁts that
motivate households into the home-ownership sector. Besides the esteemed social
status, most household prefer home-ownership over renting because they believe it
fosters family autonomy, provides environment for better child development, allows
the ﬂexibility to adapt the physical structure of the residential dwelling and has tax
advantages (Andrews and Sánchez, 2011; Doling and Elsinga, 2006; Elsinga, 2003;
Haurin et al., 2002). Households are also motivated by the welfare beneﬁts of
home-ownership, since it may serve as source of extra income and hedge against
higher housing costs in old age (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2009; Haﬀner, 2008; Elsinga
andMandič, 2010).
Home-ownership, however, involves considerable risks. Primarily, households that
acquire residential properties withmortgage loans will be faced with the risk of
defaulting on the repayments, whichmay in turn lead to foreclosure. Furthermore, the
high volatility of house prices exposes home-owners to negative equity and sale price
risk. In negative equity, the value of the residential property is below themortgage
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amount owed to the ﬁnancial institutions and this to an extent constrains household
mobility and consumption (Valletta, 2013; Dröes and Hassink, 2013; Chan, 2001).
Sale price risk constitutes the possible loss from selling the property below the
purchase price, whichmay be quite substantial. In the Netherlands, for instance,
households that bought houses in the year 2007 and 2008, lost almost 21% on the
value of their homes by the end of 2013 as a result of the large decrease in house prices
caused by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
Home-value insurance is important for reducing the property sale price risk and to
protect the accumulated home-equity which potentially yields the welfare beneﬁts (see
Doling and Ronald, 2010; Haﬀner, 2008). A section of the housing literature has
proposed using housing futures and other forms of derivatives as possible home-value
insurance schemes that may hedge the property sale price risk (Case Jr et al., 1993;
Shiller, 2003; Shiller andWeiss, 1999). In their seminal paper, Case Jr et al. (1993)
speciﬁcally suggested an insurance scheme that pays out beneﬁt to home-owners
according to the decline in a reference property price index. While the practical
implementation of home-value insurance policies have been less successful, broadly
owing to issues of illiquidity (see Swindler, 2012), the Case Jr et al. (1993) home-value
protection scheme (Case-Shiller-Weiss or CSW hereafter) has intrinsic deﬁciencies that
make it unattractive for themajority of home-owners (see Sommervoll andWood,
2011).
Characteristically, the CWS policy pays home-owners who incurred losses only if the
underlying index indicated a decline in house prices. Thus, the home-owners are not
covered against the possible adverse idiosyncratic price changes. Strangely, however,
this policy would pay beneﬁt to an home-owner who incurred no loss on selling the
residential property if the underlying index indicates a decline in house prices.
Sommervoll andWood (2011) and Sommervoll and de Haan (2014), in amore
detailed empirical analyses conducted for the entire Netherlands and for the Australian
metropolitan area of Melbourne, showed that the CSW policy actually has a very low
loss coverage. This means that majority of the policy holding home-owners that sold
properties at a loss would receive nothing or less than the actual loss. Their analyses
further established that the CWS policy has low pay-out eﬃciency and target eﬃciency,
which relate to the probability at which a policy holder incurring a loss would receive
beneﬁt from the scheme.
This paper proposes logical modiﬁcations to the CWS home-value protection scheme
that limit the forgoing deﬁciencies. It suggests pay-out schemes that are based on
aggregate measures of the underlying index and themore reasonable constriction that
pay-out are made to only those actually incurring loss on the property sales. The
proposed scheme is analysed and compared with the original CSW policy using detailed
transaction data between 1995 and 2014 in Amsterdam. The results suggest that the
modiﬁed scheme provides better cover for the sale price risk.
The rest of the paper is in sections. An overview of the related literature is presented in
Section 6.2. Section 6.3 describes themodiﬁed CSW home-value protection scheme.
Section 6.4 contains the descriptions of the data, while Section 6.5 discusses the
empirical analyses for the whole Amsterdam and the results for the various property
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types that detail the diﬀerences between the idiosyncratic risks associated with these
housingmarket segments. The paper is concluded in Section 6.6.
.............................................................................................................................
§ 6.2 Previous literature
.............................................................................................................................
This paper relates to the broader house price dynamics literature. The persistence of
house prices and their characteristic high volatility in which the price path swings up
and down to form a boom and burst cycle are well documented (see e.g. Agnello et al.,
2015; Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Muellbauer andMurphy, 1997; Droes et al.,
2010). As one of the essential lessons from the GFC, this ﬂuctuating nature of house
prices may also present a source of risk for home-owners and for the stability of the
larger economy (Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011; Aalbers, 2015; Case and Shiller, 2003;
Baker, 2008; Stephens, 2006).
Several scholars have studied the fundamental factors which drive the developments of
house prices (see, e.g. Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Case and Shiller, 1988;
Malpezzi, 1999; De Vries, 2010; DiPasquale, 1999; Himmelberg et al., 2005).
Boelhouwer et al. (2004) classiﬁed these fundamentals into four groups, namely
factors of economic development (e.g. income, interest rates), demographic factors
(population growth, etc.), institutional policy (e.g. ﬁscal tax structure, land regulations)
and speculative or psychological behaviour of home-buyers.
The psychological behaviour of home-owners relates to their expectations of future
house prices, which tend to aﬀect current property price developments (Case and
Shiller, 2003; Flood and Hodrick, 1990). While house prices wouldmaintain a stable
long-run relationship with fundamentals, the speculative and psychological eﬀect of
household behaviours are noted for contributing to the short-term ﬂuctuations (Case
and Shiller, 1988; Flood and Hodrick, 1990; Case and Shiller, 2003; Shiller et al.,
2014). A section of the literature, however identiﬁes that these temporal house price
ﬂuctuations arising from certain regionsmay spread over their inﬂuence to an entire
country, with a transitory or permanent eﬀect. This market phenomenon is often
referred to as the ripple or spillover eﬀect (see Meen, 1999; Gong et al., 2016b; Teye
and Ahelegbey, 2017).
Sinai and Souleles (2005) and Droes et al. (2010) argued that owning a home
presently may serve as a hedge against uncertainties of house prices and higher rents
in the future. This is because of the potential of accumulating substantial housing
equity whichmay be used to purchase another home later during the course of life.
Home-owners may also derive cash beneﬁts from the future sale of their properties.
However, the uncertainties with the future sale prices create the possibility that the
home-owner may incur a loss on the investment capital.
Case Jr et al. (1993) proposed hedging against the future sale price in order to insure
the home-owner against any future ﬁnancial burden. To that eﬀect, these authors also
suggested index-based derivatives and other forms of housing insurance schemes (see
also Shiller andWeiss, 1999; Shiller, 2003). Following Case Jr et al. (1993), some real
estate researchers have studied in details the nature of risk associated with house
prices, while others have investigated the pricing and applicability of the proposed
derivatives (see Sommervoll and de Haan, 2014, for a historic discussion of
home-value insurance policies). Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magne (2003), for example,
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investigated the hedging beneﬁts of real estate properties in London, whereas
Van Bragt et al. (2015) explored the risk-neutral valuation framework as pricing
method for these insurance products.
In amore detailed analysis, Peng and Thibodeau (2013, 2017), studied the
idiosyncratic risks of neighbourhood house prices. Adopting a cross-sectional
regression analysis, these authors examined if the neighbourhood characteristics of
residential properties may explain variations in the idiosyncratic risks. In their research,
Peng and Thibodeau (2013, 2017) found that idiosyncratic house price risk increases
proportionately with the neighbourhoodmedian household income and house price
volatility. Their results, however established that higher risk neighbourhoods are not
necessarily rewarded with higher price appreciations.
Dröes and Hassink (2013), similarly conducted an empirical study by decomposing the
total house price risk into an idiosyncratic and amarket component. Their research,
which is based on transaction data from the Netherlands concluded that the
idiosyncratic risks of individual residential properties are large but tend to be averaged
away using aggregatedmarket indexes inmeasuring the property price risk. The
ﬁnding of Dröes and Hassink (2013) thus suggests that an index-based home-value
insurance cannot provide a complete cover for the sale price risk of residential
properties.
In separate related studies, Sommervoll andWood (2011) and Sommervoll and
de Haan (2014) investigated the amount of risk that the index-based insurance
scheme would cover practically. The authors estimated for the diﬀerent application
areas (Melbourne and Netherlands) that the home-value insurance scheme, based on
an underlying property price index, would only cover up to 50% of the sale price risk,
leaving a large part of the idiosyncratic risks uninsured. In the contribution of this
paper, we suggest logical modiﬁcation to the original Case Jr et al. (1993) index-based
home-value insurance that provides a hedge potentially for a larger proportion of the
sale price risk. Themodiﬁcation is based on aggregate statistics of the underlying
index, which to our knowledge has not been analysed in the housing literature. Our
analysis suggests that themodiﬁed scheme provides up to 70% loss coverage.
In general, however, there are problems that currently hamper the implementation of
home-value insurance scheme. Such challenges include low trading volumes, issues
withmoral hazards and adverse selection problem as well as the appropriate pricing
method of the scheme (see Case Jr et al., 1993). The low trading volumemay result
from less patronage from the home-owners, perhaps due to the little awareness and
the general belief that house prices would continue to rise (Shiller et al., 2014). With
the recent display of high volatility in house prices and following the GFC,
home-owners are more likely to be aware of the house price risk and to seek protection
against their home equities.
On the other hand, the assurance of receiving pay-outs from the insurance policy has
intrinsic moral hazard. For instance, the home-owner may develop the attitude of
abandoning important maintenance of the residential properties, knowing that any
drop in the value of the property would be covered by the issuance policy. The adverse
selection problem arises when home-owners purposefully choose deteriorating
neighbourhoods, knowing that they would receive insurance pay-outs or when the
underwriting insurance institutions subjectively pick which neighbourhood not to grant
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insurance. As Case Jr et al. (1993) argued, imposing deductibles and stricter
government involvement may check the excesses withmoral hazards and the adverse
selection problem (see also, Shiller, 2003).
.............................................................................................................................
§ 6.3 Themodiﬁed CSW insurance scheme
.............................................................................................................................
Shiller (2003) is of the ﬁrm opinion that households could reduce risk through an
appropriate risk-sharingmechanism. The CSW is one of such schemes that enables
home-owners to share their housing risks withmore advanced portfolio managers.
More speciﬁcally, the CSW insurance policy is an index-based home-value protection
scheme that pays beneﬁt to holders that is proportional to the decline captured by the
reference residential property price index (RPPI).
For residential property j, in a designated housingmarketH; let the transaction prices
at the times s and t, with 0  s < t, be pHj;s and pHj;t respectively. For the samemarket
H; let IHs and IHt be the reference index numbers tracking the price levels in the
periods s and t. The pay-out of the CSW scheme to the home-owner of the property j
holding the policy is given as
Hj;t s = max
h
IHs   IHt

pHj;s/I
H
s ; 0
i
(6.1)
The expression (6.1) implies that the home-owner receives pay-out beneﬁt if the RPPI
for the housingmarketH indicates a decline, i.e, if IHs > IHt . However, if IHs < IHt ;
while pHj;s > pHj;t, the policy holder receives nothing. Following Sommervoll and
de Haan (2014), consider an example where the initial price of the property, pHj;s =
e100,000 and the subsequent price, pHj;t =e90,000. Assume furthermore that the
RPPI indicates amarket decline of properties by 5%. Then, the home-owner suﬀers a
loss ofe10,000 but will receive onlye5,000 if (s)he holds a CSW policy. Again,
assuming the RPPI instead indicates a price appreciation of 5%, the home-owner
receives nothing at all although the property is sold at a loss ofe10,000.
From the home-owner’s perceptive, it makesmore sense to receive the 5%market
increase after selling at such loss. This paper proposes amodiﬁed home-value
insurance policy that caters for such scenario, where pay-out is advanced to those
suﬀering loss proportionally to the house price appreciations or depreciation. This
modiﬁcation could be realised using a pay-out scheme that is based on an aggregate
measure of the reference RPPI to ensures that any accumulated home-equity over time
does not completely erode away by a sudden drop in property prices. We deﬁne the
pay-out for themodiﬁed CSW (MCSW, hereafter) insurance policy as
Hj;t s = jHt sjpHj;s1(pHj;s>pHj;t) (6.2)
where Ht s is some aggregate measure of the reference RPPI and 1(:) is the indicator
function. Unlike the CSW scheme, the expression (6.2) means the holder of the MCSW
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policy receives pay-out only if the property is sold less the purchase price (i.e., if pHj;s >
pHj;t).
The aggregate measure Ht s may take several forms. We analyse four of suchmeasures
in this paper, when
1. Ht s is themarket house price change between the times s and t,
2. Ht s is the averagemarket house price change between s and t,
3. Ht s is the averagemarket house price change between the time t of the resale of
the property and a year prior to the resale, and
4. Ht s is themarket house price change between the time of resale t and a year prior
to t.
Themarket price change is as measured by the reference RPPI. The averages for 2 & 3
are obtained over the period-to-period price changes within the indicated period. We
label these MCSW schemes respectively as MCSW1,    , MCSW4.
TheMCSW1 scheme is a CSW policy that pays the holder incurring loss beneﬁt that is
equal to themarket price appreciation or decline indicated by the HPPI. The pay-out for
theMCSW2 policy is the absolute value of the (quarterly) average house price growth
between the time of purchase and time of resale. The pay-outs for MCSW3 and
MCSW4 are respectively the same asMCSW1 andMCSW2 but their aggregation
reference period is between the time of resale (t) and a year prior to t (i.e t  4).1
Sommervoll andWood (2011) proposed three statistical measures (pay-out eﬃciency,
loss coverage, target eﬃciency) for investigating the eﬃciency of any index-based
home-value insurance policy. They deﬁned the pay-out eﬃciency (PE) as the
proportion of all pay-outs received by home-owner incurring a loss. The Loss coverage
(LC), is themost important for the home-owners. It expresses the proportion of losses
the insurance policy covers. The target eﬃciency (TE) indicates the probability that a
policy holder will receive a pay-out. More speciﬁcally, the TE is the proportion of
home-owners receiving pay-outs out of the entire policy holders incurring a loss (see
also Sommervoll and de Haan, 2014).
In principle, the closer the values of thesemeasures get to one, the better the policy
from the perceptive of the home-owners. By construction, the PE for theMCSW
scheme is one, since any home-owner suﬀering a loss will receive pay-out, unless, as it
rarely happens, the reference index indicates nomarket appreciation nor decline. On
the other hand, the PE for the CSWmay be less than one. Furthermore, the TE for the
MCSW is one by construction, while TE for the CSWmay be less than one. The PE and
TE thus shows that theMCSW is practically more eﬃcient than CSW. However, the
MCSWwill equally not cover all the losses for the policy holder. Following Sommervoll
and de Haan (2014), we call these residuals losses as idiosyncratic risks and we
examine how they vary between the diﬀerent property classes.
1 If the holding period is less than a year, t  4 is simply replaced by s.
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§ 6.4 Data description
.............................................................................................................................
The dataset for the analysis covers about 75% of all property transactions in
Amsterdam between 1995 and 2014 obtained from the Dutch National Association of
Property Brokers. Out of 150,000 raw data, we extracted 116,446 transaction sales
following a thorough data clean-up procedure detailed by Teye et al. (2017). For the
purposes of the current paper, we further extracted 22,393 repeated sale transactions
consisting of 18,029 individual residential properties. The properties fall into one of
the six categories indicated by the Dutch National Association of Property Brokers,
including terraced houses, town houses, corner houses, semi-detached houses,
detached houses and apartments.
The descriptive statistics for the repeated transactions are shown in Table 6.1. The
table indicates that apartment blocks form themajority of housing stock in
Amsterdam. Detached and terraced houses are also common, but town and
semi-detached houses are less popular. The average price change (return) between
ﬁrst and second sale is about 36.90%. Detached and semi-detached houses appear to
yield higher nominal returns than apartment blocks and terraced houses. The average
holding period between two repeated sales runs up to 20.24 quarters. The data also
reveals that about 17.86% of property transactions over the period 1995-2014 ended
in losses. The losses appear to be linked with shorter holding periods, which is not
surprising, because property prices typically appreciate above their initial levels over
longer time period.
Figure 6.1 sheds light on the distribution of the house transactions over the holding
period. It shows that a larger proportion of properties that resold within two quarters
incur losses than gains. This may indicate an inherent higher probability of selling at
loss within shorter holding periods as the proportion of losses declines sharply for
longer holding periods. Interestingly, the proportion of transactions involved in a gain
does not increase linearly with the holding period. From the ﬁgure, the percentage of
resold properties with nominal gains could be seen to increase between the 8th and
26th quarters of holding and then declines for longer holding periods.
The location and individual characteristics of the property contribute to its selling price.
In addition, the selling price would be largely determined by the economic and housing
market conditions. Home-owners are more likely to proﬁt from selling properties
duringmarket booms than in the downturns. Table 6.2 shows that the proportion of
TABLE 6.1 Summary statistics for repeated house transactions between 1995 and 2014
House type Number of
resales
Number of
dwellings
Average %
price
change
Average
holding
period
% resales
with loss
% resales
with gain
All 22,393 18,029 36.90 20.24 17.86 79.44
Terraced house 1,928 1,638 42.07 21.11 16.44 80.08
Town house 30 26 26.51 18.70 13.33 73.33
Corner house 527 453 34.70 21.62 17.65 78.37
Semi-detached house 164 139 55.84 24.38 10.98 83.54
Detached house 1,181 156 74.38 21.78 14.92 81.22
Apartment 19,563 15,617 35.95 20.07 18.10 79.36
The price change is the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and second transaction prices. Holding period is the number of quarters
between the repeated transactions.
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FIGURE 6.1 Distribution of sales over the holding periods
TABLE 6.2 Over time distribution of property transactions between 1995 and 2014
Year Number of
resales
Number of
resales with
loss
Average
price
(euros)
Average
holding
period
Average
holding
time if loss
% resales
with loss
% resales
with gain
1995 45 19 86,785 1.53 1.42 42.22 46.67
1996 116 19 111,925 3.23 2.26 16.38 80.17
1997 213 38 124,901 4.82 2.39 17.84 78.40
1998 313 41 154,136 6.92 2.46 13.10 81.79
1999 455 29 193,791 8.83 2.38 6.37 90.77
2000 610 63 217,538 9.78 1.73 10.33 86.39
2001 890 78 241,025 11.29 2.10 8.76 88.99
2002 1,046 163 227,565 13.18 3.94 15.58 81.84
2003 1,091 214 227,119 14.92 5.89 19.62 77.91
2004 1,094 160 233,414 17.01 9.36 14.63 82.18
2005 1,413 147 265,628 19.26 10.86 10.40 87.83
2006 1,615 129 258,092 19.91 8.76 7.99 89.47
2007 1,865 121 308,011 20.19 8.07 6.49 91.96
2008 1,903 145 306,762 21.37 8.78 7.62 91.01
2009 1,656 226 284,309 21.38 9.69 13.65 83.51
2010 1,641 323 293,130 23.19 11.20 19.68 77.27
2011 1,582 412 274,803 24.80 15.65 26.04 71.74
2012 1,593 609 263,713 25.22 18.62 38.23 57.19
2013 1,389 575 284,312 26.23 20.31 41.40 54.64
2014 1,863 488 293,925 28.97 23.10 26.19 71.18
The number of sales indicates total dwellings reselling in the reference year, which is a subject of sales in the same or in
previous years. Average price is computed for all repeated transactions in the reference year. Holding period is in quarters.
properties sold at loss declined signiﬁcantly during the housing boom between 2005
and 2008 in Amsterdam. On the other hand, in the course of themarket downturn
between 2002 and 2005, and following the GFC (2008-2013), the table indicates that
the average transaction price fell, while the number of losses from the repeated
property transactions grew comparatively higher within those periods. Particularly, we
can ﬁnd the proportion of properties that sold with nominal loss rising from 7.62% in
2008 to 41.40% by 2013 (Table 6.2). Over this same period, the nationwide house
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FIGURE 6.2 Amsterdam quarterly hedonic and repeated sales indexes.
price decline has been estimated at about 21%. A CSW or MCSW insurance scheme
would cover part of these losses which we investigate in this paper.
.............................................................................................................................
§ 6.5 Empirical results
.............................................................................................................................
Since the CSW andMCSW are index-based schemes, the reference RPPI plays an
important part in the analysis. This paper uses both the hedonic and the repeated sale
indexes. The hedonic indexmethod assumes that the transaction price is linked with
the (shadow) prices of enjoying the locational features and individual characteristics of
the residential property (see Hill, 2013; Rosen, 1974). By controlling for the period of
transaction, the hedonic index is estimated using ordinary least squares (see de Haan
and Diewert, 2013).
The repeated sales approach ﬁrst proposed by Bailey et al. (1963), estimates the house
index by considering properties that sold twice or more. This method involves
regressing the consecutive price diﬀerences on the set of dummies that speciﬁes the
transaction periods. The two price indexmethods are widely used and onemay be
preferred over the other depending on the purpose and the availability of data (see
de Haan and Diewert, 2013; Case and Shiller, 1987). The twomethods are both
adopted here however to cast light on the pay-out and eﬃciency of MCSW scheme.
Figure 6.2 shows the two indexes, which essentially capture an identical trend in the
house price movements but vary on the price level at certain periods. The hedonic price
index is lower mostly after the Amsterdam housingmarket downturn in 2002. In
principle, the variations in the price levels depicted by the two indexes may similarly
manifest in the corresponding pay-outs of the CSW or MCSW policy.
Table 6.3 displays the pay-out eﬃciency, target eﬃciency and the loss coverage for the
CSW andMCSW schemes. The table shows, as alreadymentioned that theMCSW
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TABLE 6.3 Pay-out eﬃciency, target eﬃciency and average loss coverage for CSW andMCSW
schemes.
Pay-out eﬃciency Target eﬃciency Loss coverage
Policy Hedonic
index
Repeated
sales index
Hedonic
index
Repeated
sales index
Hedonic
index
Repeated
sales index
CSW 0.53 0.55 0.45 0.44 0.13 0.15
MCSW1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.51 0.51
MCSW2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.06
MCSW3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.08
MCSW4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.27 0.25
Pay-out eﬃciency is the proportion of all pay-outs to home-owners inuring a loss. Target eﬃciency is the percentage
of home-owners receiving pay-outs for a loss among all sales with losses. Loss coverage is the fraction of total losses
covered by the combine pay-outs from the home-value insurance protection scheme. The reference indexes are
computed for the entire Amsterdam.
schemes have optimal pay-out and target eﬃciencies both which are approximate to
one. This is so because Figure 6.2 clearly shows that the price change between any two
point in time is nonzero. The CSW policy, however has pay-out eﬃcient ranging from
53% to 55%, and target eﬃciency of 44%-45%. By implication, there is almost 55% to
56% probability that a CSW policy holders incurring loss would receive no pay-outs.
On average, none of the home-value protection schemes provides a complete loss
coverage. Table 6.3 indicates that theMCSW1 scheme has the highest loss coverage of
about 51%. TheMCSW1 scheme advances pay-outs to holders proportional to the
decline or increase detected in the reference index between the time of purchase and
resale. TheMCSW2 andMCSW3 schemes give 6%-9% loss coverage, which is lower
than the original CWS with a potential loss coverage between 13% to 15%.
Interestingly, the MCSW4which considers the growth rate only in the immediate past
year yields a substantial loss coverage of 25% to 27%. Similar to theMCSW1 scheme,
theMCSW4 policy holder has better protection than the home-owner with the CSW
home-value product. The residual risk, however remains large with either theMCSW1
or MCSW4 scheme since the losses are not fully covered.
The residual risks may practically be considered as the idiosyncratic price risks not
shared by the entire markets (see Sommervoll andWood, 2011). To estimate these
idiosyncratic risks more precisely, Sommervoll and de Haan (2014) suggested using
customised indexes for smaller housing submarkets that share some common
characteristics. Housing submarkets may reveal unique systematic features that are
diﬀerent from the larger city or nation-widemarket. These submarkets could be spatial
aggregations or other interesting forms of market segmentations.
In a related study, Teye et al. (2017) analysed the idiosyncratic risks for the spatially
segmented Amsterdam housing submarkets. For this paper, we consider the
segmentation of the Amsterdam residential housingmarket into the three property
classes: small apartments (bedroom up to 3), large apartments (bed roomsmore than
3) and houses. Houses, include terraced houses, town houses, corner houses,
semi-detached houses and detached houses. The houses are combined into one
submarket, partly because there are few resales to enable the construction of separate
repeated sales indexes for each (see Section 6.4). The smaller and larger apartment
markets may diﬀer on their demand base. Smaller apartments may be patronisedmore
by lower-income groups, smaller-sized families and ﬁrst-time home-buyers.
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TABLE 6.4 Loss coverage for CSW andMCSW schemes.
Small apartments Large apartments Houses
Policy Hedonic
index
Repeated
sales index
Hedonic
index
Repeated
sales index
Hedonic
index
Repeated
sales index
CSW 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.14
MCSW1 0.67 0.66 0.70 0.68 0.53 0.55
MCSW2 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07
MCSW3 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10
MCSW4 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.28 0.30
Pay-out eﬃciency is the proportion of all pay-outs to home-owners inuring a loss. Target eﬃciency is the percentage
of home-owners receiving pay-outs for a loss among all sales with losses. Loss coverage is the fraction of total losses
covered by the combine pay-outs from the home-value insurance protection scheme. The reference indexes are
computed separately for the indicated housing submarket.
Bigger-sized apartments, on the other hand, may greatly appeal to larger-sized families
andmiddle-income earners.
Table 6.4 presents the loss coverage for the three submarkets. As expected, the loss
coverage (and hence the idiosyncratic price risk) varies signiﬁcantly for the housing
submarkets. The CSW insurance policy, for example, estimates the loss coverage at
15%-18%, 17%-19% and 14%-15% for small apartments, large apartments and
houses respectively. The table equally shows consistently that each of the insurance
policies (CSW or MCSW) has enhance loss coverage for larger apartments than smaller
apartments and houses. Interestingly, we can observe here again that theMCSW1 and
MCSW4 policies have higher loss coverage than the CSW scheme. TheMCSW1 scheme
especially provides substantial loss coverage of up to 66%-67%, 68%-70% and
53%-55% for small apartments, large apartments and houses respectively.
By implication, the table shows that the idiosyncratic or residual risks will be larger for
houses, followed by smaller apartments than larger apartments. Moreover, this
residual risk depends on which home-value protection scheme is adopted. The results,
however show that home-owners of any property type would be better protected
against the idiosyncratic risks using theMCSW1 andMCSW4 scheme. It is also
noteworthy that the loss coverage is slightly higher with the hedonic index than the
repeated sale index. In most cases, the loss coverage from the hedonic index is up to
2% higher than repeated sale index as reference (see Table 6.3 & 6.4).
.............................................................................................................................
§ 6.6 Concluding remarks
.............................................................................................................................
The high volatility of residential property prices in recent times once again places an
urgent need for home-owners to protect their home-value equities. This paper has
re-examined the index-based home-value protection scheme to discover the amount
of market risk that it potentially eliminates and the extent of idiosyncratic risks present
for diﬀerent categories of residential properties. The index-based home-value
insurance policy (CSW) ﬁrst proposed by Case Jr et al. (1993) advances pay-outs to its
holders based on themarket decline indicated by the reference index. The idiosyncratic
risks constitute the individual property price decreases that are not caused bymarket
forces and thus uncovered by the CSW scheme.
Using transaction data from Amsterdam spanning the period 1995 to 2014, the
analysis conﬁrms earlier results by Sommervoll andWood (2011) and Sommervoll and
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de Haan (2014) that the CSW scheme is less eﬃcient and has extremely low loss
coverage. In particular, our results, based on the hedonic and repeated sales indexes,
show that the CSW scheme has less than 45% target eﬃciency, which deﬁnes the
probability that a home-owner selling a property at a loss will receive pay-outs. The
average loss coverage is between 13% to 15%, which leaves a large proportion of
idiosyncratic risks uncovered.
A logical modiﬁcations to the CSW scheme in this paper however shows that the
eﬃciency and loss coverage could be enhanced signiﬁcantly. By using a pay-out
scheme that is based on aggregate measures of the index and restricting the pay-out to
only properties which sold at loss, themodiﬁed version has approximately 100% target
eﬃciency and the loss coveragemay be enhanced up to 51% (see Table 6.3).
Our results further show that by segmenting the Amsterdam housingmarket into
submarkets that share common characteristics, the loss coverage of themodiﬁed CSW
schememay be better improved. With themarket segmented into three: small
apartments, large apartments and houses, we observed that themodiﬁed CSW scheme
achieves respective loss coverage equal to 66%-67%, 68%-70% and 53%-55%. The
paper contains other modiﬁcations with equally higher loss coverages.
In summary, the lesson is that, segmenting themarket intomore homogeneous
submarkets leads to better protection from themodiﬁed CSW scheme and a reduction
in the residual risks, although the original schememay perform poorly. The challenge
however is that, segmenting themarket into extremely ﬁner/thinner submarkets
immensely reduces the number of (repeated) transaction sales which poses problem
for constructing a reliable index for such thin submarkets. Francke (2010), Francke and
De Vos (2000) and Schwann (1998), for example, proposedmethods for constructing
house prices indexes in thinmarkets. In a future research, suchmethods could be
applied in combinations with diﬀerent markets segmentations to study the eﬃciency
and loss coverage of the CSW scheme and its modiﬁed versions.
Our analysis does not include the pricing of themodiﬁed CSW home-value protection
schemes and the additional ﬁnancial burden to home-ownership. The pricing of these
schemesmay be one of the important issues to clarify in a future research for their
practical implementations.
In a future research, it might also be insightful to consider the general behaviour of
home-owners to housing equity insurance. While household decision about selling
residential property may depend on several factors, the assurance of receiving
insurance pay-outs might inﬂuence them to postpone the sales or opt for unreasonable
prices. Such behaviour could negatively aﬀect any housing equity insurance scheme
and would be interesting to investigate further.
The above also relates to the issue of moral hazard or what is sometimes referred to as
agency problemwhere home-owners neglect important maintenance in anticipation of
receiving insurance pay-outs. As suggested by Case Jr et al. (1993), one of the possible
ways to check this moral hazard is for the underwriting companies to impose some
minimummaintenance requirement for obtaining pay-outs. This maintenance
requirement can be practically implemented as a ﬁx percentage deductible from the
insurance pay-out.
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